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CRIPPLING IRAN: THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL
AND THE TACTIC OF DELIBERATE AMBIGUITY
JOY GORDON*
The U.N. sanctions on Iraq in the 1990s triggered a humanitarian crisis
that lasted for over a decade. Since then, many would say that U.N. sanctions
have been narrowly targeted to minimize human damage. It would seem that this
is true of the U.N. Security Council sanctions imposed on Iran. However, the
Security Council resolutions contain ambiguous terms which arguably authorize
the much more extensive sanctions imposed by the European Union and others.
These in turn have caused significant harm to the Iranian population as a
whole, very much like the measures imposed on Iraq in the 1990s.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the Iranian revolution of 1979, the United States has imposed
economic sanctions on Iran. This was criticized by many, including U.S.
allies, as extraterritorial—in that it interfered with Iran’s commercial
relations with third countries. In 2006, in response to Iran’s develop-
ment of its nuclear capacity, the United Nations Security Council
(Security Council) imposed additional sanctions. Under Article 25 of
the U.N. Charter, any measures imposed in accordance with Chapter
VII of the U.N. Charter are binding upon all member states.1 During
this time, the United States has greatly expanded its measures against
Iran, primarily through two statutes, the Comprehensive Iran Sanc-
tions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA)2 and the
Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (ITRSHA),3
as well as through a series of executive orders, and by placing informal
pressure on other nations and international institutions. These mea-
sures go well beyond those authorized by the Security Council resolu-
tions, and have broad, indiscriminate effects on Iran’s economy, family
remittances, education of Iranians abroad, and the availability and cost
of imported goods. They also affect Iran’s energy sector, and conse-
quently the cost and availability of transportation, as well as manufactur-
ing in general. The United States has largely been alone in imposing
measures on Iran and other nations that are extensive and indiscrimi-
nate. The use of broad trade sanctions with a blanket impact on the
civilian population was criticized extensively in the 1990s, giving rise to
the “smart sanctions” movement. Since then, Security Council sanc-
tions regimes have been more narrowly drafted.
The Security Council resolutions regarding Iran appear to reflect
this shift. In reality, they do not at all. The Security Council resolu-
tions imposed on Iran since 2006—particularly Resolutions 1737,4
1803,5 and 19296—have essentially operated on two levels. The ex-
plicit, binding provisions are narrowly drafted to address imports,
financial transactions, and other activities which are related to Iran’s
development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. There is also an
1. U.N. Charter art. 25; id. arts. 39-51.
2. Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, 22 U.S.C.
§§ 8501-8551 (2012).
3. Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, 22 U.S.C. §§ 8701-8795
(2012).
4. S.C. Res. 1737, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1737 (Dec. 23, 2006).
5. S.C. Res. 1803, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1803 (Mar. 3, 2008).
6. S.C. Res. 1929, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1929 (June 9, 2010).
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evidentiary requirement: member states are required to implement
these provisions only where they have reasonable grounds to believe a
particular cargo, transaction, or person has ties to Iran’s weapons
program. Thus, on their face, it would seem that the sanctions are
narrowly targeted and would have no bearing on Iran’s civilian econ-
omy; and the evidentiary requirement seems to preclude member
states from implementing them in a way would be overbroad and
indiscriminate.
However, the voluntary provisions of the Security Council’s sanctions
on Iran also contain other terms which are vague and non-binding, but
which have had enormous consequences. These resolutions ask mem-
ber states to “exercise vigilance” or use “enhanced monitoring.” They
also include other language that is not operative, such as preambular
provisions, which reference, for example, Iran’s Central Bank, without
requiring any particular action. For example, the preamble to Resolu-
tion 1929 contains the following: “recalling in particular the need to
exercise vigilance over transactions involving Iranian banks, including
the Central Bank of Iran . . .”7 These oblique references have been
invoked by the United States to exert pressure on the European Union,
Canada, Australia, and other nations to adopt national measures
against Iran that are far more extreme than those required by the
Security Council; and this language is then cited by these countries
when justifying these measures. This occurred, for example, when the
European Union froze the assets of Iran’s Central Bank, noting that “it
is necessary to require enhanced vigilance in relation to the activities of
Iran’s credit and financial institutions.”8
The end result is that the two sets of measures, both those imposed
by the Security Council and those imposed unilaterally by these na-
tions, in combination affect Iran’s economy, infrastructure, and civilian
population in a way that is deeply damaging and indiscriminate,
affecting even food security, access to health care and education. Thus,
while it seems that the Security Council sanctions are narrowly drafted
to achieve only legitimate security goals without harming the popula-
tion as a whole, in fact that is true only of the explicit provisions. But
other language—that is non-binding or vague—is invoked by member
states to justify measures that are as broad and indiscriminate in their
effects as the extreme and damaging sanctions imposed on Iraq in the
7. Id. at preamble.
8. Council Regulation 267/2012, Concerning Restrictive Measures Against Iran and Repeal-
ing Regulation No. 961/2010, 2012 O.J. (L 88) 17 (EU).
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early 1990s. Furthermore, these effects then elude accountability: the
nations imposing these measures cite the Security Council resolutions
as authority for their actions; while the Security Council can maintain
that its explicit measures conform fully with international humanitar-
ian law.
II. THE HISTORY OF TARGETED SANCTIONS
When the League of Nations was formed after World War I, the
Covenant envisioned that aggression would be stopped with the “boy-
cott,” a comprehensive set of global economic sanctions that would be
devastating.
When you consider that the League is going to consist of every
considerable nation in the world, except Germany—you can
see what the boycott will mean. No goods can be shipped in or
out, no telegraphic messages can be exchanged . . . there shall
be no communication of any kind between the people of the
other nations and the people of that nation. The nationals, the
citizens of the member states will never enter their territory,
until the matter is adjusted, and their citizens cannot leave their
territory. It is the most complete boycott ever conceived in a
public document . . . . There is not a nation that can stand that
for six months.9
However, this did not take place, at least not within the context of
global governance, until 1990, when U.N. sanctions were imposed on
Iraq.
A. The Case of Iraq
In the early 1990s, there were criticisms of a number of sanctions
regimes on the grounds the U.N. sanctions were themselves triggering
humanitarian crises. These criticisms were directed in part toward the
sanctions imposed on Haiti and the former Yugoslavia.10 However, the
case of Iraq was the most extreme.
9. WOODROW WILSON’S CASE FOR THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 69 (Hamilton Foley ed., 1923).
10. See, e.g., Julia Devin & Jaleh Dashti-Gibson, Sanctions in the Former Yugoslavia: Convoluted
Goals and Complicated Consequences, in POLITICAL GAIN AND CIVILIAN PAIN 149-188 (Thomas G. Weiss
et al. eds., 1997); Sarah Zaidi, Humanitarian Effects of the Coup and Sanctions in Haiti, in POLITICAL
GAIN AND CIVILIAN PAIN, 189-214 (Thomas G. Weiss et al. eds., 1997).
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In the wake of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the Security
Council imposed the most extensive sanctions in the history of global
governance. All exports were prohibited, including oil, which ac-
counted for 60% of Iraq’s gross domestic product and 95% of its
foreign currency earnings.11 Iraq was initially prohibited from all
imports except medicine, and, conditionally, food.12 Beginning in
March 1991, Iraq was permitted to import food and small amounts of
other humanitarian goods.13 However, there were few funds available
for these imports, even where they were permitted, because oil sales
were still prohibited.14 Immediately after the sanctions were imposed,
the Iraqi government began taking steps to compensate, putting in
place a system of food rations and incentives for farmers to increase
agricultural production.15
But while it may have been possible to compensate for the loss of
food imports over time, import substitution was more difficult in other
areas. Water treatment required chlorine, filters, and equipment that
could not be manufactured domestically, at least not in sufficient
quantities to meet the needs of the population.16 Thus, even with
efforts to compensate for the loss of income and imports, along with
some amount of ongoing illicit trade,17 Iraq’s economy was affected
very dramatically, and its infrastructure and public services began to
show signs of deterioration.
The bombing campaign of the Persian Gulf War in the winter of
1991 introduced a catastrophic level of devastation. In March 1991,
an envoy of the U.N. Secretary General described Iraq as “near-
11. Letter from the Chairman of the Panels Established Pursuant to the Note by the
President of the United Nations Security Council of 30 January 1999, to the President of the
United Nations Security Council, Annex II ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. S/1999/356 (Mar. 27, 1999).
12. S.C. Res. 661, ¶ 3-4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (Aug. 6, 1990).
13. “Decision of the Security Council Sanctions Committee regarding humanitarian assis-
tance to Iraq,” S/22400, March 22, 1991.
14. SC resolution 661 para. 3(a).
15. Rep. to the Secretary-General on Humanitarian Needs in Kuwait and Iraq, transmitted by
letter dated 20 March 1991 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security
Council, ¶ 29, U.N.Doc. S/22366, (Mar. 20, 1991) [hereinafter Report on Humanitarian Needs in
Kuwait and Iraq].
16. DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, IRAQ WATER TREATMENT VULNERABILITIES AS OF 18 JAN. 91—
KEY JUDGMENTS (1991).
17. The Volcker Committee estimated that Iraq’s illicit trade over thirteen years, primarily
with Jordan, Turkey, and Syria, totaled about $10 billion. INDEPENDENT INQUIRY COMM. INTO THE
UNITED NATIONS OIL-FOR-FOOD PROGRAMME, REPORT ON THE MANAGEMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS
OIL- FOR- FOOD PROGRAMME 32-33 (2005).
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apocalyptic.”18 He reported that “Iraq has, for some time to come, been
relegated to a pre-industrial age.”19 Much of Iraq’s electrical grid was
destroyed,20 and water and sewage treatment plants were crippled.21
While hospitals were intact, the lack of electricity meant their ability to
function was severely compromised.22 Roads and bridges were de-
stroyed, crippling food distribution and emergency transportation.23
The lack of electricity in itself meant that
food that is imported cannot be preserved and distributed;
water cannot be purified; sewage cannot be pumped away and
cleansed; crops cannot be irrigated; medicaments cannot be
conveyed where they are required; needs cannot even be effec-
tively assessed. It is unmistakable that the Iraqi people may soon
face a further imminent catastrophe, which could include
epidemic and famine, if massive life-supporting needs are not
rapidly met.24
In the face of this devastation, the sanctions took on new signifi-
cance. There was no longer an industrial base that could be adapted to
manufacture goods that had previously been imported. The reconstruc-
tion of Iraq’s infrastructure would have required not only massive
quantities of imported goods, but also the construction of large-scale
facilities involving sophisticated technology, such as electric plants.
The humanitarian consequences were immediate, severe and endur-
ing. Epidemics of cholera and typhoid spread widely.25 Even with the
ration system, the World Food Program reported that “the sanctions
have caused persistent deprivation,” including “severe hunger and
malnutrition,”26 and medical services declined precipitously.27 Unem-
18. Report on Humanitarian Needs in Kuwait and Iraq, supra note 15, ¶ 8.
19. Id.
20. Id. ¶ 9.
21. Id. ¶ 21.
22. Id. ¶ 10.
23. Id. ¶ 33.
24. Id. ¶ 37.
25. UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN’S FUND (UNICEF/IRAQ), SITUATION ANALYSIS OF CHILDREN AND
WOMEN IN IRAQ 33 (1998).
26. UNITED NATIONS, FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION/WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME, SPECIAL
ALERT NO. 237: FAO/WFP CROP AND FOOD SUPPLY ASSESSMENT MISSION TO IRAQ (1993).
27. As of April 1996, UNICEF reported that based on its survey, one-third of all hospital beds
were closed; more than half of all diagnostic and therapeutic equipment was not working; all
hospitals visited lacked proper illumination, hygiene, water supplies, or waste disposal; postopera-
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ployment spiked as the economy collapsed.28 Primary school atten-
dance dropped as families sent their children to work instead of
school.29
The sanctions on Iraq brought condemnation from many quarters.
Typical of these concerns was an address to the U.N. General Assembly,
where the president of the International Committee of the Red Cross
asked
political leaders to take greater account of humanitarian crite-
ria when taking decisions to impose economic and financial
sanctions. Perhaps we should give special thought here to the
grave effects on public health when water purification and
pumping installations are paralyzed. Is it not incongruous to
impose debilitating sanctions with one hand while with the
other bringing in humanitarian aid to restore supplies vital to
the population’s survival?30
B. The Emergence of Targeted Sanctions
As the humanitarian harm from sanctions came under increasing
criticism, a movement emerged among academics and practitioners to
develop sanctions that would more directly affect the political and
military leadership of the target state without causing harm to the
civilian population. A 1996 report by the Carnegie Commission on
Preventing Deadly Conflict maintained that “sanctions should be part
of a broader influence strategy that puts maximum political and
economic pressure on the offending parties—preferably regimes or
specific leaders, rather than whole populations.”31 A report by a
consultant to the Security Council recommended monitoring public
health indicators, such as malnutrition and child mortality, as well as
economic indicators, such as the availability of essential goods.32
tive care and pain management in some hospitals was limited to aspirin; and rural hospitals were
unable to serve their populations because of a lack of ambulances. UNICEF/Iraq, supra note 25,
at 41.
28. ERIC HOSKINS, UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN’S FUND (UNICEF) BAGHDAD, IRAQ: CHILDREN,
WAR AND SANCTIONS 4 (1993).
29. SARAH GRAHAM- BROWN, SANCTIONING SADDAM: THE POLITICS OF INTERVENTION IN IRAQ 182
(1999).
30. U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., 65th mtg. at 27, U.N. Doc. A/49/PV.65 (Nov. 23, 1994).
31. CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON PREVENTING DEADLY CONFLICT: FINAL REPORT 54-55 (1997).
32. LARRY MINEAR, ET AL., TOWARD MORE HUMANE AND EFFECTIVE SANCTIONS MANAGEMENT:
ENHANCING THE CAPACITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM vi (1998).
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Beginning in the late 1990s, workshops were held to develop tar-
geted financial sanctions. These included round table discussions
organized by Brown University’s Watson Institute and the Council on
Foreign Relations on banking, crime, and economic sanctions in May
1998,33 as well as a set of meetings known as the Interlaken Process in
1998 and 1999, sponsored by the Swiss government.34 Similarly, the
Bonn-Berlin Process in 1999 and 2000 developed recommendations
and model resolutions concerning arms embargoes and travel restric-
tions.35 In 2000, the International Peace Academy held a conference
entitled “Toward Smarter, More Effective U.N. Sanctions,”36 as well as a
policy forum the following year in conjunction with a special session of
the Security Council on sanctions.37 There were also other efforts
specifically addressing the Security Council’s use of targeted sanctions,
including the Stockholm Process, a series of discussions in 2002 which
involved over one hundred experts, from which the findings were
presented to the Security Council in early 2003.38 In 2006, a working
group of the Security Council made recommendations regarding the
use of sanctions, including the use of experts, methods for the design
and implementation of sanctions, and evaluation of the sanctions’
effectiveness.39 In 2006, the Informal Working Group of the Security
Council on General Issues of Sanctions produced a report with recom-
mendations for the design and implementation of sanctions, and
articulating standards for best practices. The report called for the
Security Council, in drafting resolutions, to “give due consideration” to
“the possible humanitarian, political, and economic impacts.”40 In
imposing sanctions, the working group called for the Security Council
33. Watson Inst. for Int’l Studies, The Targeted Financial Sanctions Project at the Watson Institute,
http://www.watson.institute/tfs/targetedfinsan.cfm.
34. Thomas Biersteker, et al., Consensus from the Bottom Up? Assessing the Influence of the
Sanctions Reform Processes, in INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS: BETWEEN WORDS AND WARS IN THE GLOBAL
SYSTEM 15, 17 (Peter Wallensteen & Carina Staibano eds., 2005).
35. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF ARMS EMBARGOES AND TRAVEL AND AVIATION RELATED
SANCTIONS: RESULTS OF THE BONN-BERLIN PROCESS (Michael Brzoska ed., 2001).
36. United Nations Secretariat, Department of Political Affairs, The Experience of the United
Nations in Administering Arms Embargoes and Travel Sanctions, in DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF
ARMS EMBARGOES AND TRAVEL AND AVIATION RELATED SANCTIONS: RESULTS OF THE BONN-BERLIN
PROCESS 46 (Michael Brzoska ed., 2001).
37. Watson Inst. for Int’l Studies, supra note 33.
38. Uppsala Universitet, Dep’t of Peace and Conflict Research, The Sanctions Program Special
Program on the International Targeted Sanctions (SPITS), http://www.smartsanctions.se.
39. U.N.S.C. Rep. of the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues
of Sanctions, U.N. Doc. S/2006/997 (Dec. 18, 2006).
40. Id. at 4.
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to “[c]learly define the scope of the sanctions, as well as the conditions
and criteria for their easing or lifting,”41 and to “[s]tandardize humani-
tarian and other exemptions.”42 Shortly after that, the United Nations
began establishing panels of experts to monitor sanctions regimes,
conducting extensive field visits, and drawing on the expertise of their
members in the areas of weapons, illicit trade, and the particular
regions involved.
Thus, considerable effort has gone into developing targeted sanc-
tions that would be more effective in affecting the decision making of
political leaders, or would more successfully prevent the flow of the
goods that are themselves a source of conflict, while seeking to avoid
harm to the civilian population of the target state.
III. THE SANCTIONS ON IRAN
A. The U.S. Sanctions on Iran
U.S. sanctions on Iran do not even attempt to operate as targeted
sanctions, despite the occasional rhetorical disclaimers. While the
United States is the most extreme in its unilateral measures against
Iran, U.S. officials have often claimed that the sanctions are narrowly
targeted to affect only the political and military leadership, and that
their intent is not to harm the Iranian people. At a press briefing
in 2010, for example, a State Department official said that the
United States is seeking to “target specific entities within the Iranian
Government but not punish the Iranian people.”43 Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton said, “our efforts to apply pressure on Iran are not
meant to punish the Iranian people, they are meant to change the
approach that the Iranian Government has taken toward its nuclear
program.”44 A senior U.S. official said: “[w]e have never been attracted
to the idea of trying to get the whole world to cordon off their
economy.”45 After the adoption of Resolution 1929, the White House
issued a “fact sheet” which stated that “[t]hese sanctions have been
carefully designed to target those individuals and entities that are
most responsible for Iran’s nuclear program. They are not intended to
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Press Release, National Iranian American Council, Obama Administration Officials’
Statements on Iran Sanctions (Jan. 27, 2010).
44. Id.
45. Id.
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hurt the people of Iran.”46
At the same time, officials sometimes acknowledge that, in fact, the
U.S. sanctions systematically seek to cripple Iran’s energy sector, its
access to global banking, its ability to generate revenue from oil sales,
and its capacity to ship goods of any sort. As a White House spokesman
noted in the summer of 2012, “[f]rom the beginning of the administra-
tion we have steadily built the most comprehensive and biting sanctions
regime that the Iranian government has ever faced.”47
The United States has had sanctions in place against Iran since the
1979 revolution, when the Carter administration froze Iranian assets in
the United States.48 In the 1980s, under the Reagan administration, the
sanctions were expanded to prohibit the import or export of a wide
range of goods or services to Iran.49 In 1996, Congress passed the
Iran-Libya Sanctions Act,50 which was criticized as extraterritorial for
imposing penalties on foreign companies that invested in Iran’s energy
sector.51 In 1997, Iran signed a $2 billion contract with three compa-
nies—Russia’s Gazprom, Malaysia’s Petronas, and France’s Total SA—to
develop one of its natural gas fields. The United States declared the
project to be in violation of U.S. law, triggering objections from the
international community, including a complaint filed by the European
Union with the World Trade Organization. The matter was ultimately
resolved diplomatically, and the complaint was withdrawn.52 After that,
the United States did not declare a foreign company to be in violation
of the U.S. sanctions against Iran for more than decade.53
Up through 2005, the United States did not have a great deal of
international support for its measures against Iran. Between 2000 and
2005, in a series of decisions where the United States was outvoted by its
allies, the World Bank approved $1.4 billion in loans to Iran for water,
environmental, and housing projects, as well as earthquake relief.54
46. Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet on the New U.N.
Security Council Sanctions on Iran (June 9, 2010).
47. Press Release, Deputy National Security Advisor Ben Rhodes, On-the-Record Conference
Call on Iran Sanctions (July 31, 2012).
48. Patrick Clawson, Iran Primer: U.S. Sanctions, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE (Mar. 30,
2013), available at http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/us-sanctions.
49. Id.
50. The Act became known as the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) after the removal of sanctions
against Libya.
51. KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20871, IRAN SANCTIONS 7, 12 (2011).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 13.
54. Id.
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In 2010, Congress passed CISADA,55 which amended the Iran Sanc-
tions Act (ISA), targeting the sale of gasoline and equipment for the
production of gasoline, on the reasoning that Iran imported about
40% of the gasoline necessary to meet its needs, and undermining its
ability to import or produce gasoline would put pressure on its lead-
ers.56 The ISA and CISADA established an array of penalties to be
imposed on foreign companies that traded with Iran. These included
the denial of U.S. bank loans, export-import bank loans or credits;
licenses to export U.S. military technology; prohibiting foreign compa-
nies from acquiring, holding, or trading any U.S.-based property; and a
prohibition on participating in foreign exchange transactions.57 In
2010, the Obama administration began aggressively imposing penalties
on foreign companies for trading with Iran and actively pressuring
other companies to withdraw from Iran. Naftiran Intertrade Company,
a company owned by Iranians but based in Switzerland, was denied
Export-Import Bank credit, dual use export licensing, and bank loans
of more than $10 million. In addition, a number of major oil compa-
nies (Total, Norway’s Statoil, Italy’s ENI, and Royal Dutch Shell) that
had investments in Iran agreed to terminate their business with Iran.58
This was followed in 2011 with a sanctions determination against
Belarusneft, a Belarusian company,59 as well as several other companies
involved in shipping or selling gasoline to Iran.60
The United States has also been aggressive in interfering with Iran’s
access to the international banking system. According to U.S. officials,
between 2006 and 2011, the United States successfully pressured about
eighty foreign banks to sever ties with Iran.61 This is not surprising,
given the magnitude of U.S. enforcement efforts against foreign banks.
The Treasury Department has imposed enormous fines on foreign
banks that engage in U.S. dollar denominated transactions with Iran,
including a $100 million fine of the Swiss bank UBS, and a $536 million
fine on Credit Suisse.62
The United States has repeatedly expanded its direct and indirect
55. Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, 22 U.S.C.
§ 8501 (2012).
56. KATZMAN , supra note 51, at 8.
57. Id. at 10.
58. Id. at 14.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 15.
61. Id. at 32.
62. Id. at 32-33.
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measures against Iran, including penalties against foreign companies
that engage in ordinary business with Iran, unrelated to its nuclear
program or weapons systems. In November 2011, the Obama Adminis-
tration issued an executive order imposing penalties on foreign compa-
nies with sales to Iran of more than $1 million for equipment and
services related to its oil industry, or sales of more than $250,000 of
goods or services for Iran’s petrochemical production.63 In July 2012,
the Obama Administration issued an executive order applying exten-
sive sanctions on any company that purchases oil or petrochemical
products from Iran. 64 In August 2012, Congress passed the ITRSHA,65
imposing sanctions in several additional situations, including owning a
ship that is used to transport Iranian crude oil, participating in a joint
venture with Iran related to mining, or participating in a joint venture
with Iran for oil or gas development outside of Iran.66 ITRSHA also
imposes penalties on any company that provides insurance or re-
insurance to Iran’s national oil company or Iran’s national tanker
company.67 In addition, ITRSHA imposes penalties on any person who
engages in a “significant transaction” with the Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps.68 The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2013 also applies CISADA sanctions to foreign banks that facilitate
transactions with Iran’s energy sector shipping industry, including
transactions with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), National
Iranian Tanker Company (NITC), and the Islamic Republic of Iran
Shipping Lines (IRISL).69
B. The U.N. Security Council Sanctions on Iran
In contrast with the U.S. measures imposed on Iran under CISADA,
ITRSHA, and various executive orders, the U.N. Security Council
sanctions on Iran since 200670 are much narrower in scope. They
63. Exec. Order No. 13,590, 3 C.F.R. § 284 (2012).
64. Exec. Order No. 13,622, 77 Fed. Reg. 45,897 (Aug. 2, 2012).
65. Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, 22 U.S.C. § 8701 (2012).
66. KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20871, IRAN SANCTIONS 5-6 (2013).
67. Id. at 6.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 28.
70. S.C. Res. 1696, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1696 (July 31, 2000); S.C. Res. 1737, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1737 (Dec. 23, 2006), S.C. Res. 1747, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1747 (Mar. 24, 2007); S.C. Res.
1803, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1803 (Mar. 3, 2008), S.C. Res. 1929, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1929 (June 9,
2010); S.C. Res. 1984, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1984 (June 9, 2011); S.C. Res. 2049, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/2049 (June 7, 2012).
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appear to reflect the accumulated wisdom of the development of
targeted sanctions over the last two decades. They do not explicitly
prohibit member states from, for example, exporting food, medicine,
or humanitarian goods to Iran. The Security Council’s sanctions re-
gime, at least on its face, is narrowly concerned with weapons prolifera-
tion, specifically ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. The preamble
to Resolution 1737 describes the Council as “determined to constrain
Iran’s development of sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear
and missile programmes,” and “[c]oncerned by the proliferation risks
presented by the Iranian nuclear programme.” The resolutions do not
explicitly prohibit states from exporting commercial goods to Iran, or
engaging in oil sales, financial transactions, or shipping, except insofar
as they are tied in some way to acquiring or developing weapons.
In addition, the resolutions include references to humanitarian
concerns in the context of religious obligations: Resolution 1803 pro-
vides that states shall “take into account humanitarian considerations,
including religious obligations,”71 and Resolution 1929 provides that
the 1737 Committee (the committee established by the Security Coun-
cil to oversee the sanctions on Iran) may decide on a case-by-case basis
to permit listed individuals to travel to Iran, if the committee finds
that “that such travel is justified on the grounds of humanitarian
need, including religious obligations.”72 Individuals whose assets are
frozen are allowed some limited funds for basic expenses, such as food,
rent, and medical treatment.73 Resolution 1737 provides that states
shall “take into account humanitarian considerations.” However, it
provides no explicit guidance on what constitutes “humanitarian con-
siderations,” and requires only that states “take [them] into account,”
not that states actually limit their practices so as not to create humani-
tarian problems.74 The resolutions do not envision the possibility that
the sanctions may fundamentally compromise commerce,75 and Iran’s
71. “All States shall, in the implementation of the above paragraph, take into account
humanitarian considerations, including religious obligations.” S.C. Res. 1803, supra note 68, ¶ 4.
72. S.C. Res. 1929, supra note 70, ¶ 10.
73. S.C. Res. 1737, supra note 70, ¶ 13.
74. “Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance regarding the entry into or transit through their
territories of individuals who are engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for
Iran’s proliferation of sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon
delivery systems . . . that all States shall, in the implementation of the above paragraph, take into
account humanitarian considerations” S.C. Res. 1737, supra note 70, ¶ 10-11.
75. One of the rare exceptions concerns the prohibition on providing services to cargo ships.
Resolution 1929 “underlines that this paragraph is not intended to affect legal economic activities”
(emphasis in original), although this provision is only a statement of the Council’s intent, and
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economy overall, to a degree that would itself constitute humanitarian
harm.
There are two institutional bodies that would have been well-
suited to provide oversight on the humanitarian consequences of the
sanctions: the “1737 Committee,” the committee of the Security
Council established by Resolution 1737 to oversee the implementation
of the sanctions on Iran, and the panel of experts appointed by the
United Nations to monitor the sanctions. The 1737 Committee in-
structs states to provide information regarding their enforcement
efforts; to respond to violations of sanctions; to consider requests for
exemptions; to determine whether other goods should be prohibited,
and whether other individuals or companies should be sanctioned; to
issue guidelines to states for implementation of the sanctions; and to
provide quarterly reports to the Council.76 However, the Committee is
not mandated to monitor the humanitarian impact of the sanctions
whose implementation it oversees. Nor is the panel of experts man-
dated or designed to monitor the humanitarian impact of sanctions.
Although there are some sanctions regimes in which the correspond-
ing panel of experts contains an individual with expertise in humanitar-
ian issues,77 in the case of Iran, no specialists are appointed to the panel
with expertise in public health, or humanitarian or socioeconomic
issues. All the members of the panel are specialists in weapons or
logistics.78 Nor is the panel of experts mandated to monitor or report
on the humanitarian or socioeconomic effects of the sanctions. The
panel is only mandated to assist the committee in enforcement of the
sanctions, gather and analyze information related to implementation
and non-compliance, recommend ways to improve implementation,
provides no actual limitations on the sanctions in the event that they do affect legal commerce.
S.C. Res. 1929, supra note 70, ¶ 18.
76. S.C. Res. 1737, supra note 70, ¶ 18.
77. For example, in 2010 a humanitarian expert was appointed to the panel of experts to
monitor the sanctions regime imposed on Somalia. U.N. Monitoring Group on Somalia and
Eritrea, Rep. of the Monitoring Group Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1916 (2010), ¶ 14,
U.N. Doc. S/2011/433 (July 18, 2011).
78. The members of the panel appointed in July 2012 are: Mr. Jonathan Brewer (finance and
private sector); Kenichiro Matsubayashi (marine transport and immigration issues); Thomas
Mazet (customs enforcement, export control and transport); Jacqueline W. Shire (nuclear issues);
Elena G. Vodopolova (missile technology); Olaschinde Ishola Williams (conventional arms and
related material and the financing of illicit arms transfers); Wenlei Xu (export control); and
Salome´ Zourabichvili (non-proliferation/nuclear and conventional disarmament). U.N. Secretary-
General, Letter dated 5 July 2012 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2012/521 (July 6, 2012).
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and report to the Council.79 Thus, neither the 1737 Committee nor
the panel of experts have the authority or qualifications to determine
whether the sanctions are affecting Iran’s civilian population or are
triggering a humanitarian crisis, nor do they have the ability to monitor
whether states are interpreting the sanctions so broadly as to cause
humanitarian problems.
It would seem that there is no need for either group to have such a
mandate. If the sanctions only prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear
weapons and ballistic missiles, then depriving the country of those
could hardly cause any harm to the population. Nevertheless, if we look
closely at the language of the resolutions and of the ties between the
Security Council resolutions and the unilateral measures of various
states, a very different picture emerges. While the sanctions on Iran
seem to be narrowly targeted, in fact they are systemic, indiscriminate,
and cause widespread damage to the Iranian population.
1. The Mandatory Provisions
The mandatory provisions of the Security Council resolutions con-
cerning Iran appear to be closely tied to ballistic missiles and nuclear
weapons proliferation (or in Resolution 1929, large weapons systems).
For example, Resolution 1737 “Decides that Iran shall not export any of
the items in documents S/2006/814 and S/2006/815 and that all
Member States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran
by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or
not originating in the territory of Iran.”80 The documents cited, in
turn, refer to lists of equipment and materials related to nuclear
weapons and ballistic missiles, respectively.81
Resolution 1737 also provides for freezing the assets of persons or
companies with ties to nuclear weapons proliferation, or other individu-
als or entities “directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s
proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear
79. S.C. Res. 1929, supra note 70, ¶ 29.
80. S.C. Res. 1737, supra note 70, ¶ 7.
81. Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations, Annex to the Letter dated
13 October 2006 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations Addressed
to the President of the Security Council, List of Items, Materials, Equipment, Goods and
Technology Related to Nuclear Programmes, U.N. Doc. S/2006/814 (October 13, 2006); Per-
manent Representative of France to the United Nations, Letter dated 13 October 2006 from the
Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the
Security Council, List of Items, Materials, Equipment, Goods and Technology Related to Ballistic
Missile Programmes, U.N. Doc. S/2006/815 (October 13, 2006).
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weapon delivery systems.”82 Member states are prohibited from
granting entry or transit to such persons, or others who are “directly
associated with or [are] providing support for Iran’s proliferation
sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon
delivery systems.”83 Resolution 1803 likewise requires states to take
measures to prevent the supply, sale, or transfer of goods related to
nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles.84
Resolution 1929 expands the sanctions substantially. It prohibits Iran
from acquiring an interest in any commercial activity in any other state
involving uranium mining, nuclear technology, or technology related
to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, and prohib-
its states from allowing Iranian investments in their territory in relation
to these activities.85 Resolution 1929 also requires that states prevent
the transfer of technology, and that they take measures to block their
nationals from providing Iraq with technical assistance relating to
nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles.86 In addition, the resolution
instructs states to require that their nationals “exercise vigilance” when
doing business with IRISL or the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC), if they have reasonable grounds “to believe that such business
could contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or
the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.”87 Finally, Resolu-
tion 1929 requires states to prevent their nationals from engaging in
the sale or transit of large weapons systems, such as tanks, warships,
attack helicopters, and missiles to Iran, and to prevent nationals from
providing technical training, financial resources, or other services
related to these goods.88
The resolutions also require states to implement sanctions against
particular persons, companies, and foundations included in lists drawn
up by the Council, which are annexed to the resolutions.89 These lists,
in turn, consist of persons and entities involved in Iran’s nuclear and
ballistic programs, or particular persons or companies related to the
82. S.C. Res. 1737, supra note 70, ¶ 12.
83. Id. at ¶ 10.
84. S.C. Res. 1803, supra note 70, ¶ 8.
85. S.C. Res. 1929, supra note 70, ¶ 7.
86. Id. at ¶ 9.
87. Id. ¶ 22.
88. Id. ¶ 8.
89. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1737, supra note 68, ¶ 12; S.C. Res. 1803, supra note 70, ¶¶ 5, 8; S.C. Res.
1929, supra note 70, ¶¶ 11-12, 19.
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The lists are relatively narrow. For example, they include two of
Iran’s banks, Bank Sepah and First East Export Bank, but none of its
other significant banks, such as Bank Melli, Bank Saderat, or the
Central Bank of Iran.91 The lists include some of the units or compa-
nies owned by the Revolutionary Guard, but these are only a few out of
the IRGC’s vast economic network. They include three shipping compa-
nies,92 but not Iran’s major shipping lines—IRISL NIOC, NITC, or any
other companies in their extensive network of subsidiaries.
In addition, the resolutions also contain an evidentiary requirement.
Resolution 1929 prohibits states from providing fuel or services to ships
that are owned or under contract to Iranians, “if they have information
that provides reasonable grounds to believe” the ships are carrying
prohibited goods.93 Similarly, it provides that states shall require their
nationals to exercise vigilance when dealing with Iranian companies “if
they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that
such business could contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear
activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.”94
Resolution 1803 contains a comparable provision.95
Thus, it seems that the mandatory provisions of the resolutions are
directly tied to nuclear concerns and missile systems (or, in the case of
Resolution 1929, large weapons systems). The annexed lists target
specific companies and individuals that purportedly have ties to nuclear
weapons and ballistic missiles. In addition, it appears that the enforce-
ment cannot be arbitrary or based upon speculation, since a state must
have evidence that the cargo, technology, individual, or company has
ties to these weapon systems in order to employ enforcement mecha-
nisms against them.
2. The Voluntary Provisions
Like the mandatory measures, the voluntary measures invoke con-
cerns with nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles. For example, Resolu-
90. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1737, supra note 68, Annex; S.C. Res. 1803, Annexes I-II; S.C. Res. 1929,
Annexes I-III.
91. U.N. Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1737, Individuals
and Entities Designated as Subject to the Travel Ban and Assets Freeze, THE UNITED NATIONS (2012),
available at http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1737/pdf/1737ConsolidatedList.pdf.
92. S.C. Res. 1929, supra note 70, Annex III.
93. Id. ¶ 18.
94. Id. ¶ 22.
95. S.C. Res. 1803, supra note 70, ¶ 11.
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tion 1803 asks (“calls upon”) states to exercise vigilance and restraint in
granting entry or transit to individuals directly association with Iran’s
nuclear weapons program,96 and it also asks states to exercise vigilance
in regard to public financing of trade with Iran, to avoid contributing
to Iran’s nuclear weapons program.97 It asks states to exercise vigilance
over Iranian banks with branches in their jurisdiction to avoid financial
activities contributing to Iran’s development of nuclear weapons.98
Resolution 1929 asks states to exercise vigilance over transactions with
the IRGC that could contribute to Iran’s nuclear weapons program.99 It
also asks states to prevent the provision of financial services to Iranian
companies,100 to prohibit Iranian banks from operating in their terri-
tory,101 and to prohibit their financial institutions from operating in
Iran,102 where these activities contribute to Iran’s nuclear weapons
program. The preamble to Resolution 1929 calls for vigilance over
transactions involving Iranian banks, including the Central Bank of
Iran, to prevent financial transactions from contributing to Iran’s
nuclear weapons program.103 In addition to prohibiting financial
institutions from opening branches in Iran, and prohibiting Iranian
banks from operating in their territories, Resolution 1929 includes a
blanket provision that asks states to prevent their nationals from
providing funds or financial services in general, to anyone, if the state
has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that these
would contribute to Iran’s nuclear weapons program.104
Like the mandatory provisions, the voluntary terms often contain an
evidentiary requirement, suggesting that the implementation of the
measures will not be arbitrary. For example, Resolution 1929 calls upon
states to inspect all cargo to and from Iran in their territory, including
seaports and airports, if the state “has information that provides
reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contains items” that are on the
lists of prohibited goods.105 Resolution 1929 also calls upon states to
prohibit financial institutions within their jurisdiction from opening
branches or bank accounts in Iran “if they have information that
96. Id. ¶ 3.
97. Id. ¶ 9.
98. Id. ¶ 10.
99. S.C. Res. 1929, supra note 70, ¶ 12.
100. Id. ¶ 21.
101. Id. ¶ 23-24.
102. Id. ¶ 21.
103. Id. at preamble.
104. Id. ¶ 21.
105. Id. ¶ 14.
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provides reasonable grounds to believe” that these financial services
could contribute to Iran’s nuclear weapons program.106 Additionally,
Resolution 1929 calls on states to prohibit Iranian banks from opening
branches or maintaining relationships with banks in their jurisdiction,
“if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe”
this could contribute to Iran’s nuclear weapons program.107
Thus, as with the mandatory provisions, it seems that the voluntary
provisions are narrowly drafted to address legitimate concerns regard-
ing nuclear proliferation, and it seems that the evidentiary require-
ment would preclude enforcement on arbitrary or speculative grounds.
However, as we will see, that is not the case in practice.
IV. THE ROLE OF DELIBERATE AMBIGUITY IN THE IRAN RESOLUTIONS
The explicit and binding language of the resolutions is, for the most
part, narrowly drafted. However, there are other non-binding terms,
terms that are not part of the operative provisions at all, or terms that
sound innocuous and vague. These terms include the use of vague and
ambiguous language such as “exercising vigilance,” which is invoked by
some nations as though they constitute an implied authorization to
impose measures that go well beyond the explicit, binding provisions of
the resolutions. The United States and its allies on this matter—the
European Union, Canada, Australia, Japan, and South Korea—are
known as the “like-minded” countries.108 There are several different
ways that they have invoked oblique, vague, or non-operative language
106. “Calls upon States to take appropriate measures that prohibit financial institutions within
their territories or under their jurisdiction from opening representative offices or subsidiaries or
banking accounts in Iran if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that
such financial services could contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the
development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.” Id. ¶ 24.
107. “Calls upon States to take appropriate measures that prohibit in their territories the
opening of new branches, subsidiaries, or representative offices of Iranian banks, and also that
prohibit Iranian banks from establishing new joint ventures, taking an ownership interest in or
establishing or maintaining correspondent relationships with banks in their jurisdiction to
prevent the provision of financial services if they have information that provides reasonable
grounds to believe that these activities could contribute to Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear
activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.” Id. ¶ 23.
108. “But importantly, we’ve also worked to build an international coalition as well, so that
our own actions are amplified. So we were able to work through the U.N. Security Council to
achieve Resolution 1929, which put in place the broadest and most comprehensive multilateral
sanctions that Iran has ever faced. And then, working from that basis, we’ve worked with
like-minded nations to continue to increase the pressure on the Iranians.” Press Release,
On-the-Record Conference Call on Iran Sanctions, supra note 45.
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from the Security Council resolutions to justify their own unilateral
measures against Iran. The country that has been most aggressive in
lobbying for these measures, and most extreme in imposing its own
unilateral measures against Iran, has been the United States, and the
Obama Administration has been considerably more aggressive in devel-
oping and enforcing sanctions than the Bush Administration, imposing
penalties on banks on the order of half a billion dollars each.109
The Security Council has for the most part been unwilling to
explicitly adopt the extreme measures against Iran for which the
United States has consistently lobbied. Even the most extreme of the
Iran resolutions, Resolution 1929, adopted by the Council in June
2010, “[fell] short of the Obama administration’s stated objective to
impose ‘crippling sanctions’ on Iran . . .”110 The United States “was
unsuccessful in getting explicit support for many key provisions it
sought to include,”111 such as restrictions on investment or trading with
Iran’s energy sector, a comprehensive arms embargo, a comprehensive
ban on dealing with the IRGC, IRISL, or Iran Air cargo, a requirement
(rather than a non-binding request) for states to inspect vessels sus-
pected of carrying proliferation-related materials to Iran, and the
blacklisting of Iran’s central bank.112
However, while Resolution 1929 imposed few additional mandatory
measures, a number of new voluntary measures were “called for.”
There was also preambular language concerning the “potential connec-
tion between Iran’s revenues derived from its energy sector and the
funding of Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities” and lan-
guage about “exercis[ing] vigilance and caution over transactions
involving Iranian banks, including the Central Bank of Iran.”
This represented a compromise that arguably gave implied authoriza-
tion to the United States and its allies to impose harsher measures,
while allowing China and Russia to implement only the explicit,
required ones.113 Meanwhile, the “like-minded” nations developed and
109. Civil Penalties and Enforcement Information, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, http://www.treasury.
gov/resource-center/sanctions/CivPen/Pages/civpen-index2.aspx.
110. Glenn Kessler & Colum Lynch, U.S., Partners Agree to Sanctions on Iran, WASHINGTON POST
(May 19, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/18/
AR2010051801988pf.html.
111. Covington & Burling, LLP, E-Alert: U.N. Security Council Approves New Sanctions Against
Iran 1 (June 9, 2010).
112. Id. at 3-4.
113. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929 was the first Resolution in two years to impose
actual new sanctions against Iran. (The previous one was Resolution 1803 of March 3, 2008). The
resolution was enacted after exhaustive U.S. diplomacy intended to overcome the objections of
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coordinated sanctions measures that they imposed autonomously,
while invoking the oblique terms of the Security Council resolutions as
authority.114 As one commentator noted, “[s]ome states (referred to by
the United States and EU-3 as the ‘like-minded’) may use the call for
vigilance as an opportunity to go beyond the resolution’s requirements
and formally prohibit a given activity. It could also be used as an excuse
for governments to exercise oversight of commercial matters in which
they might otherwise be politically or legally constrained.”115
For example, in July 2010, Canada’s prime minister announced that
Canada was imposing additional sanctions in Iran, beyond those re-
quired by Resolution 1929, “in close consultation with like-minded
partners, including the United States and the European Union.”116
Canada’s measures under the Special Economic Measures Act (SEMA)
are quite broad. SEMA prohibits Canadian companies from exporting
goods, services, or equipment for Iran’s energy or telecommunications
sectors; prohibits companies from conducting financial transactions or
importing oil from Iran.117
Canada’s report to the Security Council notes that Resolution 1929
requires states to impose sanctions on the three entities of IRISL
designated by the resolution. But Canada expanded this provision to
IRISL itself, prohibiting Canadian nationals from providing any ser-
vices to IRISL vessels, regardless of whether their cargo is related to
weapons, or only involves ordinary commercial goods. Canada imposed
these measures even though Resolution 1929 contains explicit lan-
guage to the contrary: the Security Council “underlines that this para-
Russia and China to any U.N. sanctions that would harm Iran’s civilian economy or population.
Resolution 1929 included a formula under which very few new sanctions against Iran were
mandatory, but a great many new sanctions were authorized or called for. This structure enabled
countries such as China and Russia to follow only the letter of the Resolution, while allowing the
United States and its allies to go far further in imposing sweeping new bilateral and multilateral
sanctions against Iran. KENNETH KATZMAN, ATLANTIC COUNCIL, ADDENDUM: U.S.-IRANIAN RELATIONS
—COMPENDIUM OF U.S. POLICIES, LAWS, AND REGULATIONS 1-2 (2010).
114. “Participants were countries that have imposed bilateral sanctions on Iran over its
nuclear program that go beyond U.N. Security Council sanctions. The group includes the
United States, the European Union and several European nations, Australia, Japan, South Korea
and other countries but it was not clear if all of them were represented. The United States
attended.” Philip Pullella & Roberto Landucci, Diplomats Agree to Increase Pressure on Iran, REUTERS 1
(Dec. 20, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/20/us-iran-sanctions-meeting-id
USTRE7BJ1XJ20111220.
115. Id. at 2-3.
116. Iran: New Developments, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE CANADA, http://
www.international.gc.ca/sanctions/iran.aspx?lang5eng&view5d.
117. Id.
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graph is not intended to affect legal economic activities.”118
The same was true of the measures imposed by the European Union
in 2010, to implement Resolution 1929, but also going well beyond it.
The European Union imposed a ban on the sale of equipment and
services for Iran’s energy sector, as well as a ban on financing energy
projects, effectively blocking companies from involvement in oil and
gas extraction in Iran.119 EU member nations were prohibited from
providing aid or loans to Iran, or from voting to support financial
support from institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank.120
European companies were prohibited from providing insurance or
reinsurance to Iranian shipping companies, and European airports
were prohibited from allowing Iran Air Cargo flights to land. No
European banks were allowed to open new branches in Iran, and no
Iranian banks were allowed to open new branches in the European
Union.121 Japan and South Korea imposed similar measures as well.122
In January 2012, the European Union imposed additional measures,
banning oil imports from Iran, and freezing the assets of Iran’s Central
Bank.123 In March 2012, the EU Council adopted a decision to termi-
nate Iran’s access to SWIFT, which is located in Brussels and subject to
EU laws. SWIFT is the global system that provides secure communica-
tion of financial messaging among financial institutions throughout
the world.124
Australia also imposed autonomous measures that went beyond the
terms of the Security Council resolutions. It prohibited the export of
equipment and technology for Iran’s oil and gas industry, blocked
financing for companies involved in Iran’s petrochemical or energy
118. S.C. Res. 1929, supra note 70, ¶ 18.
119. KATZMAN, supra note 51, at 45.
120. Id. at 44.
121. KATZMAN, supra note 113, at 2.
122. Id. at 2.
123. Justyna Pawlak & David Brunnstrom, Here is an Outline of EU Sanctions Against Iran over its
Nuclear Program, REUTERS (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/23/us-iran-
eu-factbox-idUSTRE80M0JC20120123.
124. “Tera´n explained that SWIFT, which connects entities in 212 countries and territories
and ensures the secure exchange of financial messages, does not handle funds but does play a role
in the sanctions regime. Following a March 2012 EU Council Decision, financial messaging bodies
were required to discontinue services to EU-listed Iranian entities. SWIFT, which is headquartered
in Brussels and therefore subject to EU regulation, then discontinued its communications services
to Iranian financial institutions subject to EU sanctions.” 23 November 2012: Discussion Meeting—EU
sanctions on Iran, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, available at http://www.iiss.org/
events-calendar/2012-events-archive/november-2012/eu-sanctions-on-iran-an-explanation/.
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enterprises, prohibited opening branches of Australian financial insti-
tutions in Iran, and prohibited Iranian banks from opening branches
in Australia.125
A. The “Vigilance” Language
There are numerous references to “exercising vigilance” in Resolu-
tions 1737, 1803, and 1929. These include calls for “vigilance,” or
“vigilance and restraint,” or “enhanced monitoring.” These are found
in the context of both the mandatory and voluntary provisions of the
resolutions, as well as in preambular language. For example, Resolu-
tion 1737 calls upon states “to exercise vigilance” in granting entry or
transit to individuals associated with Iran’s weapons program126 and
also calls upon states “to exercise vigilance” in regard to providing
training to Iranians which could contribute to Iran’s nuclear weapons
program.127 Resolution 1803 calls on states “to exercise vigilance and
restraint” regarding the entry or transit of individuals associated with
Iran’s weapons programs,128 to “exercise vigilance” in regard to provid-
ing publicly funded financial support for trade with Iran,129 and “to
exercise vigilance” over the activities of all of their financial institutions
with Iranian banks, in particular Bank Melli and Bank Saderat, two of
Iran’s leading banks.130 Resolution 1929 calls upon states “to exercise
vigilance” over transactions involving the IRGC that could contribute
to Iran’s nuclear program.131 None of the resolutions explicitly say
what would constitute “vigilance” or “restraint” or “enhanced monitor-
ing.”
Even where the reference to “vigilance” is found in mandatory
provisions, the term is vague and conveys little concrete guidance
regarding actions or policies. As the Panel of Experts noted, “[t]here is
no general understanding of the definition of ‘vigilance’” in paragraph
22 of Resolution 1929.132 Some states used close supervision; some had
licensing requirements; some required notification, while others re-
125. Autonomous Sanctions Regulations 2011, Select Legislative Instrument 2011 No. 247 as
amended (Australia).
126. S.C. Res. 1737, supra note 70, ¶ 10.
127. Id. ¶ 17.
128. S.C. Res. 1803, supra note 70, ¶ 3.
129. Id. ¶ 9.
130. Id. ¶ 10.
131. S.C. Res. 1929, supra note 68, ¶ 12.
132. U.N. Group of Experts on Iran, Final Rep. of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant
to Resolution 1929 (2010) ¶ 190, U.N. Doc. S/2012/395 (June 12, 2012).
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quired prior authorization for permitted financial transactions.133 This
seems to have been deliberate. One commentator noted that “[i]n
general, the ‘vigilance’ provisions represent compromises over activi-
ties that some of the P-511 states [the five permanent Security Council
members plus Germany] would like to see prohibited but others would
not.”134 However, while the United States has long exceeded the scope
of the Security Council measures, the “like-minded” countries have
relied on this language in order to justify unilateral measures that
exceed to scope of the clear terms of the resolutions themselves.
For example, in freezing the assets of Iran’s Central Bank, the
European Union cited the “vigilance” provision as justification: “In
consideration of Iran’s attempts at using its financial system for the
purpose of circumventing the sanctions, it is necessary to require
enhanced vigilance in relation to the activities of Iran’s credit and
financial institutions so as to prevent circumvention of this Regulation,
including the freezing of the assets of the Central Bank of Iran.”135
B. Financial Action Task Force
The preamble of Resolution 1803 “[w]elcomes the guidance issued
by the Financial Actions Task Force (FATF) to assist States in implement-
ing their financial obligations under [R]esolution 1737 (2006).”136 The
FATF, an intergovernmental body that develops policies concerning
international financial crimes, has provided elaborate recommenda-
tions for the implementation of the Security Council sanctions. The
FATF states that the recommendations are intended to “provide guid-
ance to financial institutions whose products and services could lead to
their direct or indirect involvement in the provision to Iran” of finan-
cial services or the transfer of prohibited goods.137 However, the FATF
recommendations provide a rationale for a very extreme interpretation
of what compliance with the resolutions would entail. For example, in
its analysis of Resolution 1737, the FATF states that “[j]urisdictions
should encourage financial institutions to consider among others the
following determinants of risk . . . to assist in identifying high-risk
customers and transactions: i) customers and transactions associated
133. U.N. Group of Experts on Iran, Final Rep. of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant
to Resolution 1929 (2010) ¶ 190, U.N. Doc. S/2012/395 (June 12, 2012).
134. Philip Pullella & Roberto Landucci, supra note 114, at 2.
135. Council Regulation no. 267/2012, supra note 8 (emphasis added).
136. S.C. Res. 1803, supra note 70, pmbl.
137. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, GUIDANCE REGARDING THE IMPLE-
MENTATION OF ACTIVITY-BASED FINANCIAL PROHIBITIONS OF U.N. S.C.R. 1737, 3 (2007).
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with Iran.”138 In regard to “high-risk customers and/or transactions,”
the FATF suggests that financial institutions “may consider” taking
steps “such as terminating the relationship with the relevant customer
or account.”139 Thus, the FATF guidance suggests that compliance with
Resolution 1737 would entail that all financial institutions sever all
relationships and transactions with Iran, even though the explicit
language of the resolution requires only that member states take
measures to prevent transactions relating to nuclear weapons and
ballistic missiles.
In its recommendations issued in February 2012, the FATF main-
tained that “enhanced due diligence measures” should be taken in
circumstances where there is a higher risk of money laundering or
terrorist financing.140 These risk factors, in turn, include countries
subject to sanctions or embargoes issued by the United Nations, which
includes Iran. The FATF suggests that the enhanced due diligence on
the part of financial institutions could include refusing the establish-
ment of branches or subsidiaries of financial institutions from the
country concerned, and limiting business relationships or transactions
with persons or institutions from that country.141
C. “Could”
The United States has taken the view that the use of word “could” in
Resolution 1929 should be interpreted broadly, so as to effectively
vitiate the evidentiary requirement. In testimony before the House
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Daniel Glaser, the
Treasury Department’s Deputy Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financ-
ing and Financial Crimes, maintained that Resolution 1929 “imposes
systemic measures” which “go well beyond what was contained in
previous resolutions.”142 Resolution 1929 asks member states to “pre-
vent the provision of financial services, including insurance or re-
insurance . . . if they have information that provides reasonable grounds
to believe that such services . . . could contribute to Iran’s proliferation-
138. Id. at 5.
139. Id. at 6.
140. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON
COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM & PROLIFERATION—THE FATF
RECOMMENDATIONS 19 (2012).
141. Id. at 63.
142. Implementation of Iran Sanctions: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform,
111th Cong. 3 (2010) (statement of Daniel Glaser, Deputy Assistant for Terrorist Financing and
Financial Crimes, U.S. Department of the Treasury).
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sensitive nuclear activities.”143 Glaser gives the same reading for paral-
lel provisions with regard to shipping and trade.144
Glaser seems to read the resolution as asking states to take harsh
measures against Iran not only where banking, trade, or shipping
would certainly, or probably, contribute to Iran’s nuclear program, but
also where it is merely possible that they might contribute. Thus, there
would be no need for evidence to show that a particular cargo or
transaction in fact contributes to Iran’s nuclear program, but only
speculation that it “could” contribute.
D. Iran’s Energy Sector
While the Security Council did not approve measures that directly
target Iran’s energy sector, the preamble to Resolution 1929 “not[es]
the potential connection” between Iran’s oil revenues and the funding
of its nuclear program, and also “notes” that some of the equipment
used in the petrochemical industry can also be used with nuclear
fuel.145
On its face, the preambular language seems to add little of value in
preventing Iran’s nuclear activities, since multiple resolutions already
contain extensive provisions targeting equipment and transactions
relating to every aspect of Iran’s proliferation-sensitive activities. How-
ever, this preambular note provided language that could be invoked by
the European Union and the “like-minded” countries to justify their
measures blocking oil purchases from Iran, and prohibiting the export
of equipment and materials for Iran’s oil industry.
For example, a decision of the Council of the European Union in
January 2012 references this clause:
Recalling the potential connection between Iran’s revenues
derived from its energy sector and the funding of Iran’s prolif-
eration-sensitive nuclear activities and that chemical process
equipment and materials required for the petrochemical in-
dustry have much in common with those required for certain
sensitive nuclear fuel cycle activities, as underlined in [U.N.
Security Council Resolution] 1929 (2010), the sale, supply or
transfer to Iran of further key equipment and technology which
could be used in key sectors in the oil and natural gas industry
143. Id. (emphasis in the original).
144. Id. at 3-4.
145. Preamble, SCR 1929.
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or, in the petrochemical industry, should be prohibited. More-
over, Member States should prohibit any new investment in the
petrochemical sector in Iran.146
E. Bank Melli and Bank Saderat
Resolution 1803 asks member states to use “vigilance” in regard to
two of Iran’s leading banks, Bank Melli, the largest commercial retail
bank in Iran, and Bank Saderat, Iran’s export bank. Both are among
the largest banks in the Middle East. The Security Council
Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance over the activities of
financial institutions in their territories with all banks domi-
ciled in Iran, in particular with Bank Melli and Bank Saderat,
and their branches and subsidiaries abroad, in order to avoid
such activities contributing to the proliferation sensitive nuclear
activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery
systems, as referred to in [R]esolution 1737.147
In its commentary on Resolution 1803, the FATF maintained that
Competent authorities should consider transactions, accounts
or relationships that their financial institutions may have with
Iranian banks, and particularly Bank Melli and Bank Saderat, as
high risk for purposes of enhanced supervision and monitor-
ing . . . Due to the particular risks associated with Bank Melli
and Bank Saderat as identified in S/RES/1803(2008), jurisdic-
tions should consider adopting additional preventive measures
with respect to these two Iranian banks.148
Although the “vigilance” language regarding the two banks was non-
binding, as were the recommendations of the FATF, in 2012, the EU
Council, citing the need for “vigilance,”149 blacklisted and froze the
146. Council Decision 2012/35/CFSP, Amending Decision 2010/413/CFSP Concerning
Restrictive Measures Against Iran, 2012 O.J (L 19) 8.
147. S.C. Res. 1803, supra note 70, ¶ 10.
148. FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, GUIDANCE PAPER: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF FINANCIAL
PROVISIONS OF U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1803, 6 (2008).
149. “In consideration of Iran’s attempts at using its financial system for the purpose of
circumventing the sanctions, it is necessary to require enhanced vigilance in relation to the
activities of Iran’s credit and financial institutions so as to prevent circumvention of this
Regulation, including the freezing of the assets of the Central Bank of Iran.” Council Regulation
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assets of these two banks.150
F. Central Bank of Iran
The preamble of Resolution 1929 “recall[s] in particular the need
to exercise vigilance over transactions involving Iranian banks, including
the Central Bank of Iran, so as to prevent such transactions contribut-
ing to proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, or to the development
of nuclear weapon delivery systems.”151 This language is ostensibly
concerned only with transactions of the Central Bank related to Iran’s
nuclear program. However, it served as a justification for freezing all
assets of Iran’s Central Bank. The language of “vigilance” appears, for
example, in the European Union’s legislation adopted in March 2012:
“In consideration of Iran’s attempts at using its financial system for the
purpose of circumventing the sanctions, it is necessary to require
enhanced vigilance in relation to the activities of Iran’s credit and
financial institutions so as to prevent circumvention of this Regulation,
including the freezing of the assets of the Central Bank of Iran.”152
Thus, the vague language of “vigilance,” contained in a clause found in
the preamble rather than the operative provisions, concerning the
development of a nuclear program, was invoked to justify terminating
all transactions, for any purpose, with a financial institution critical to
Iran’s entire economy.
V. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNILATERAL MEASURES
Given the many ways that the measures of the United States and its
allies have broadly targeted Iran’s shipping, financial transactions, and
energy sector, it is unsurprising that the effects of the sanctions go
well beyond simply depriving Iran of the means to produce nuclear
weapons. A number of foreign companies have severed their commer-
cial ties with Iran, even where their business activities had no relation to
nuclear proliferation, Iran’s military or the IRGC, or human rights
violations by the regime, but were simply participating in Iran’s civilian
economy. In 2007, the French bank BNP Paribas stopped pursuing any
new business in Iran.153 In 2010, the Swiss engineering company ABB
267/2012, Concerning Restrictive Measures Against Iran and Repealing Regulation No 961/2010,
2012 O.J. (L 88) 17.
150. Id. at L 88/10, Annex IX.
151. S.C. Res. 1929, supra note 68, pmbl. (emphasis added).
152. Council Regulation 267/2012, supra note 145 (emphasis added).
153. KATZMAN, supra note 51, at 51.
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stopped doing business with Iran, as did Germany’s Siemens, which
had been involved with Iran’s telecommunications infrastructure.154
Several major automobile manufacturers stopped selling cars to Iran,
including Germany’s Daimler, as well as Toyota, Hyundai, and Kia.155
In 2011, the Danish shipping company Maersk announced that it
would no longer use Iran’s three largest ports.156
Treasury and State Departments officials said that they had per-
suaded at least eighty banks to stop doing business with Iranian
banks.157 A number of major European banks withdrew from Iran,
including UBS, HSBC, Commerzbank AG, and Deutsche Bank AG.158
In September, 2010, the Under-Secretary for the U.S. Treasury Depart-
ment stated that “today, Iran is effectively unable to access financial
services from reputable banks and is increasingly unable to conduct
major transactions in dollars or Euros.”159
Iran’s energy sector has been affected in several ways. For example,
in 2010, BP, citing the EU sanctions, cancelled a joint venture with an
Iranian company, and the partners in the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline said
that it would not be used to transport Iranian gas.160 Schlumberger, the
oil services giant, announced in 2010 that it would terminate its
operations with Iran.161 In response to the U.S. CISADA legislation, a
number of companies stopped selling gasoline to Iran, including
Russia’s Lukoil, Royal Dutch Shell, France’s Total, and Kuwait’s Inde-
pendent Petroleum Group.162 The result was an estimated 75% reduc-
tion in Iran’s gasoline imports.163 In addition, there are shipping
companies that refuse to ship gasoline to Iran, and at least two insurers,
including the British company Lloyd’s, will not provide insurance for
gasoline shipments to Iran.164
These illustrate how the measures of the United States and the
“like-minded” nations, often invoking the oblique and ambiguous
provisions of the Security Council resolutions, have brought about an
embargo of Iran that goes well beyond the explicit requirements of
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 50.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 53.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 59.
163. Id. at 58.
164. Id. at 59.
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the resolutions, fundamentally compromising Iran’s energy sector,
imports, exports, and international financial transactions.
VI. THE HUMANITARIAN IMPACT ON THE IRANIAN POPULATION
In August 2012, the U.N. Secretary-General reported that
The sanctions imposed on the Islamic Republic of Iran have
had significant effects on the general population, including
an escalation in inflation, a rise in commodities and energy
costs, an increase in the rate of unemployment and a shortage
of necessary items, including medicine. A number of Iranian
non-governmental organizations and activists have expressed
concerns about the growing impact of sanctions on the popula-
tion and have noted that inflation, rising prices of com-
modities, subsidy cuts and sanctions are compounding each
other and having far-reaching effects on the general pop-
ulation. They report, for instance, that people do not have
access to lifesaving medicines. Furthermore, since the sanc-
tions extend to banking transactions, many foreign banks have
stopped doing business with the Islamic Republic of Iran
altogether, which has made it considerably difficult for Iranians
to transfer funds and for private business to obtain lines of
credit.
The sanctions also appear to be affecting humanitarian opera-
tions in the country. Even companies that have obtained the
requisite license to import food and medicine are facing difficul-
ties in finding third-country banks to process the transactions.
Owing to payment problems, several medical companies have
[stopped] exporting medicines to the Islamic Republic of Iran,
leading to a reported shortage of drugs used in the treatment of
various illnesses, including cancer, heart and respiratory condi-
tions, thalassemia and multiple sclerosis. 165
It has been apparent for some time that the sanctions are doing
indiscriminate harm to Iran’s economy and its population as a whole.
In July 2011, anecdotal reports suggested that merchants were having
difficulty finding trade financing, insurance, and shipping availability,
and their costs had increased by an estimated 40%, where they were
165. U.N. Secretary-General, Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran:
Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 42-43, U.N.Doc. A/67/327 (August 22, 2012).
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even able at all to complete the transaction.166 In May 2012, unemploy-
ment was estimated to be around 20%, and was closer to 30% for
people under thirty years old.167 Bankruptcies have increased substan-
tially.168
Far from targeting the Iranian regime and the military, the sanctions
are harming the political opposition to the regime, as well as women
and other vulnerable groups. Medicines for chronic illnesses such as
asthma, multiple sclerosis, and cancer are often no longer affordable,
and sometimes cannot be found, even at very high prices. In January
2013, the Guardian reported on “the crisis [the sanctions] triggered in
the Iranian pharmaceutical market, and the impact that it has had on
millions of Iranians with chronic health problems.” Although U.S. and
European companies are theoretically permitted to sell medicines to
Iraq, because of the banking restrictions, it is difficult to find any banks
that will handle the financial transactions.169
While the economic trends affect the population as a whole, they
specifically increase the hardship on women. While women carry the
larger burden of ensuring their families’ well-being, they are also
the most economically vulnerable. Women have a harder time
finding jobs, are among the first to get laid off, and have fewer
workplace protections. As those primarily responsible for run-
ning their households, women face increased loads of stress
trying to feed their families, obtain needed medication, and
buy necessary goods amidst skyrocketing levels of inflation.170
The sanctions have also triggered greater oppression by the regime,
reducing the space for dissent and democratic opposition. The Interna-
tional Civil Society Action Network noted that “the sanctions and threat
of war allow the state to invoke ‘a state of emergency’ and in so doing
suppress critics and voices of dissent.”171 One consequence of the
166. KATZMAN, supra note 51, at 50.
167. Sanctions Against Iran: A Duplicitous ‘Alternative’ to War, RAHA: IRANIAN FEMINIST COL-
LECTIVE (May 8, 2012), http://rahacollective.org/articles-2/sanctions-against-iran-a-duplicitous-
alternative-to-war/.
168. Id.
169. Julian Borger & Saeed Kamali Dehghan, How life-saving drugs are caught up in Iranian
sanctions, THE GUARDIAN (Jan.13, 2013), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jan/13/iran-
sanctions-tehran-uranium-enrichment.
170. Sanctions Against Iran: A Duplicitous ‘Alternative’ to War, supra note 167.
171. INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SOCIETY ACTION NETWORK (ICAN), WHAT THE WOMEN SAY—KILLING
THEM SOFTLY: THE STARK IMPACT OF SANCTIONS ON THE LIVES OF ORDINARY IRANIANS 2 (2012).
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banking sanctions is that Iranian students are being denied access to
British and other universities, because there is no legal way to make
financial transfers to pay their school fees.172
Rather than starving the IRGC and the Iranian regime, the criminal-
ization of normal international commerce means that much of the
economy is now tied to the black market or gray market. For a private
company to import equipment and materials for production requires
ties to the IRGC or bribes to the regime, with the result that the IRGC
and the regime hold far greater political power and far greater control
over the economy. “The lack of access to normal banking has the effect
of forcing a shift to a cash-based economy, making Iranians dependent
on black marketeers to transfer funds to relatives abroad, or pay for
educational or health costs.”173 While the sanctions specifically target
the Revolutionary Guards for their repressive tactics, the effect of the
sanctions is that they permit the Guards “to behave like a mafia
controlling lucrative black and grey markets.”174 Thus, as sanctions
criminalize ordinary commerce, systemic corruption becomes the norm
for commerce. The result is that the regime and elite military units are
not only insulated from the sanctions, but in fact stand to gain
considerable profits.
VII. CONCLUSION
To claim that the sanctions are targeting Iran’s regime, and that the
sanctions are not intended or designed to affect the population as a
whole, is flatly disingenuous. The calls for “vigilance” and the use of
other oblique and ambiguous language deliberately provides a means
for all the sanctioning parties to deny responsibility for the hardship
caused by the measures: the Security Council can maintain that its
resolutions are narrowly drafted to address only Iran’s access to nuclear
weapons, while the United States and its allies can claim that they are
only acting in accordance with the wishes of the Security Council. The
calls for “vigilance” and the other vague and ambiguous provisions are
an arrangement that serves to provide mutual plausible deniability.
The lack of attention to humanitarian effects is striking, coming on
the heels of the disastrous damage done by sanctions to the population
of Iraq.175 But this is because the sanctions regimes imposed by the
172. Id. at 3.
173. Id. at 4.
174. RAHA: IRANIAN FEMINIST COLLECTIVE, supra note 167.
175. See supra Part II.A.
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Council since the 1990s have been viewed as targeted measures:
preventing a state from acquiring materials for ballistic missiles, for
example, will surely have nothing to with the basic needs of the civilian
population, so there is no need to monitor the economic or humanitar-
ian effects.
If the member states implemented only the explicit and manda-
tory provisions of the resolutions, then the effects, for the most part,
would have been limited to interfering in Iran’s development of
nuclear weapons. If the member states had implemented the voluntary
provisions only to the extent that there were reasonable grounds to
believe that cargo or financial transactions or other activities were in
fact contributing to Iran’s nuclear weapons program, then the sanc-
tions would not have impacted Iran’s economy as a whole. However,
invoking the language of “vigilance” and “enhanced monitoring,” the
United States and its allies imposed measures that are so far reaching as
to affect Iran’s economy on a structural level, doing broad and indis-
criminate harm to the economy and the population. These measures
include blanket prohibitions on trade with IRISL and Iran’s other
major shipping lines, not just the particular subsidiaries listed in the
Security Council Resolutions, and are not limited to circumstances
where there is evidence of prohibited cargo. Similarly, the measures
have blocked insurance and reinsurance for ships transporting legal
cargo to and from Iran. The same is true of blanket prohibitions on
financial transactions with Iranian banks, even where the bank is not
listed in a Security Council resolution or engaged in transactions
related to Iran’s nuclear program. The same is true of the blanket
requirement to freeze the assets of and block trade with the entire
IRGC, a massive enterprise with major roles in Iran’s telecommunica-
tions system, and infrastructure construction, even though Security
Council resolutions identify only specific subsidiaries of the IRGC with
ties to Iran’s military and its nuclear program.
The results are not much different than extreme, harsh measures
imposed on Iraq that, quite aside from the bombing campaign, did
enormous harm to the population; all on the premise that if the
suffering is great enough, the population will be desperate enough to
bring down the state. Where the sanctions on Iraq explicitly prohibited
almost all imports and exports, the sanctions on Iran, as implemented
by the “like-minded” countries, achieve the same result by different
means: cutting off gasoline sales to Iran and blocking goods and
investment in Iran’s energy sector; bankrupting the state by blocking
oil exports; preventing cargo shipments by targeting Iran’s national
shipping lines, as well as denying access to ports, airports, and shipping
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insurance; cutting off access of Iranian banks to SWIFT, the global hub
used for all international commercial transactions; and prohibiting
financial transactions with all of Iran’s major banks, including the
Central Bank. While neither the Security Council nor national sanc-
tions explicitly state that their intent is to undermine food security or
access to health care and education, these measures in fact compro-
mise every sector of the economy and public services that are directly or
indirectly necessary for well-being in a modern society, including
electricity and transportation.
The United States, the Security Council, and the “like-minded na-
tions” may invoke security as the reason for their policies. But from
Weimar Germany to present-day Iraq, we should by now know that
devastating an entire people, whether by bombs or by the relentless
degradation of daily life, does not in the end bring greater security for
anyone.
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